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Antagonism between established churches and newly emergent re-
ligious groups is not unique to our time. Ways in which religious and 
judicial authorities may deal with a leader and set of followers who operate 
outside the approval of the orthodox are disclosed in the New Testament, 
while historians have described others: expulsions, proscriptions, burnings 
with or without trial. The opprobrium dispensed upon Mormons, Free-
masons and Roman Catholics in nineteenth century America is remark-
ably parallel to current attitudes toward cults.1 Thus the leadership in our 
day of Christian clergy, rabbis or "born again" laity against the cults is 
historically no surprise. They stand in a long tradition of authorities 
disturbed by word of a new messiah or the itinerant teaching of a strange 
guru. What is new in the confrontation of cults and churches today is, on 
the one hand, that we live in a society with a constitutional guarantee of 
religious liberty and, on the other, that we have only recently become 
aware of a new technology—psychological manipulation. We talk not 
about witch hunts and heresy trials but about brainwashing, de-program-
ming and coercive persuasion. The question is whether new techniques 
render contemporary cults sufficiently different from their predecessors as 
to warrant special confrontation and if they are, what kind of confrontation 
can be appropriate in view of our constitutional commitments.2 
i 
The Constitution's First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no 
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law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof." We need not review all the Supreme Court decisions which have 
cited and interpreted these words to remind ourselves of the importance of 
both phrases. The "no establishment" clause, combined with the dis-
allowance of any religious test for the holding of public office (Article VI of 
the Constitution), forbids any state-determined orthodoxy. The state, for 
example, is not to define what is acceptable as a religious belief, providing 
a basis even for something in which it is as essentially interested as 
conscientious objection.3 Humanistic or secular views, as long as they are 
"not based on policy, pragmatism, or expediency . . . are constitutionally 
religious."4 Meanwhile, the "free exercise" clause has helped avoid 
governmental interference or "entanglement" in religious faith or wor-
ship. Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson made the point abun-
dantly clear in defending the rights of Jehovah's Witnesses: "If there is any 
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or 
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess by word or act 
their faith therein."5 
That "fixed star" actually shines with a light which pre-dates the 
Constitution's. In 1777 Thomas Jefferson framed a "Bill for Establishing 
Religious Freedom" for consideration by the House of Delegates of 
Virginia. The bill proposed 
that no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious 
worship, place or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, 
restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall 
otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or beliefs; but 
that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, 
their opinion in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no 
wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.6 
Jefferson called it " a dangerous folly" to "suffer the civil magistrate to 
intrude his powers into the field of opinion" and insisted on his own great 
faith 
that truth is great and will prevail if left to herself, that she is the 
proper and sufficient antagonist to error, and has nothing to fear 
from the conflict, unless by human interposition disarmed of her 
natural weapons, free argument and debate, errors ceasing to be 
dangerous when it is permitted freely to contradict them.7 
Among the many maneuvers which postponed the General Assembly's 
deliberation of Jefferson's bill was a proposal by Patrick Henry, " A bill 
establishing a provision for teachers of the Christian Religion." No 
particular denomination or sect would be established; rather, all would be 
supported from general taxation. In the absence of Jefferson, then serving 
as ambassador to France, James Madison identified the dangers in 
Henry's proposal in his celebrated "Memorial and Remonstrance to the 
General Assembly on the Commonwealth of Virginia," circulated in the 
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summer of 1785. Madison declared that because it is held " a fundamental 
and undeniable t ru th" that religion and "the manner of discharging i t " 
are to be "directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or 
violence," it followed that " T h e Religion . . . of every man must be left to 
the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man 
to exercise it as these may dictate."8 One implication of Henry's gener-
alized establishment Madison saw as pernicious was that "the Bill implies 
either that the Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious Truth; or 
that he may employ Religion as an engine of civil policy." Madison 
underscores both: " the first is an arrogant pretension . . . the second an 
unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation."9 Stopping the progress 
of Henry's bill, Madison managed finally to call for action on Jefferson's, 
which passed the House December 17, 1785 and the Senate by January 16, 
1786. While Jefferson recognized that any succeeding legislature would 
have the power to rescind the actions of its predecessors, he tried to point 
out in the closing paragraph of his bill that they would not have the 
" r ight , " for indeed, the bill asserted "natural rights of mankind." 1 0 
Religious liberty was becoming a "fixed star" in the American constella-
tion. 
Those who find cults dangerous to personal well-being and/or the 
common good argue that constitutional guarantees ought not to apply to 
cults because they are distinctively different from traditional religious 
groups, either because of their supposedly mind-manipulative techniques 
or in view of their allegedly commercial or exploitative purposes. The term 
"cul t" has proved particularly useful to many in distinguishing these from 
what are apparently more acceptable religious and spiritual groups, 
although the term is rarely defined. Examples of cult members may be 
offered instead: Hare Krishnas, Moonies or Jonestown victims, but a 
definition is assumed from common usage or media mock-up. Only others 
belong to cults; we participate, if at all, in "deeply meaningful religious 
groups." While the term is merely a pejorative in popular usage, 
historians of religion continue to employ it to designate groups which do 
not quite fit the categories of church, faith-tradition, denomination or 
sect.11 A sect will generally remain within a faith-tradition while emphasiz-
ing a specific tenet or practice as essential for salvation; a cult, instead of 
identifying with a particular historical stream, will center instead on a 
spiritually-dominant leader and an ecstatic experience he/she has known 
which the followers may achieve. While useful in historical and religious 
studies, such a definition hardly justifies a status any different from other 
religious communities either in terms of the First Amendment or of the tax 
exemption categories of the Internal Revenue Service. The commercial 
enterprises of cults may not be that dissimilar from the vineyards and cattle 
ranches of orthodox groups. The issue which anti-cultists therefore press is 
a more ominous one: included in the characteristics of cults is their use of 
mind-manipulative procedures by which young people are coerced into 
commitment of themselves, their allegiances, activities and personal wealth 
to the group or its leader without their actual volition or informed 
consent.12 
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The Korean War contributed the term "brainwashing" to popular 
vocabulary. Military psychiatrists asserted that prisoners of war had been 
subjected to techniques which had forced them to make pro-Communist 
statements. Robert Lifton followed this theory with extensive interviews of 
civilian as well as military personnel, reporting his findings in the now-
classic book, Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism, in which he 
identifies the basic procedures of brainwashing.13 "Milieu control" re-
moves one's capacity to influence the conditions of his or her own life, 
using dietary restrictions, sleep deprivation, unpredictable interruptions 
and a time schedule to inhibit private reflection. "Communication 
control" involves forcing thought into the confines of interview questions 
as well as censoring communication with others. "Mystical manipulation" 
uses rewards and punishments as well as proffered trust and distrust to 
elicit and reinforce dependency. The "demand for puri ty" divides the 
experienced world into the pure and the impure, developing in the subject 
strong approbations of guilt and shame, with emphasis on confession using 
techniques of total exposure to purge the self of any remnants of its own 
identity. A "sacred science" will maintain an aura of holiness about basic 
doctrines and "loading the language" will tend to terminate personal 
thought through oversimplification, repetition and constricted termi-
nology. Doctrine is valued over persons, their experiences and views; 
through the "dispensing of existence" people are differentiated from non-
people according to compliance or non-compliance with the ideology.14 
Lifton's analysis is not necessarily limited to the indoctrination pro-
cedures used by the Chinese Communists against prisoners; he discovered 
these same techniques in J im Jones ' People's Temple.15 A leader can win 
an "extraordinary degree of psychological submission with the promise of 
transcendence."1 6 Members of a cult thus can feel a part of something 
greater than themselves. In Jonestown, Jones was able to elicit and 
reinforce the absolute loyalty of his devotees through his control of all 
communication, his surveillance system and the repetition of terms and 
phrases which were so introjected that even internal communication 
maintained the same categories. Individual guilt feelings were stimulated 
and manipulated by public criticism, confession and humiliation. Jones 
"dispensed existence" by insisting that only those who saw the light and 
would follow the path he prescribed would earn the right to exist. At the 
end, only those willing to undergo the "white night" experience, demon-
strating willingness to die by drinking the common potion, could claim the 
privilege to live. 
To be sure, the People's Temple is an extreme case of the power of 
brainwashing. Unique features include the pathology of its leader and the 
social conditions of Jonestown. Nonetheless, other groups may be as 
absolute in their claims to possess truth and as exclusive in defining the line 
between the redeemed and the unredeemed. Others, too, control commu-
nication by prescribed terminology and sacred propositions, disallowing 
individual differences in basic views. The argument against such groups 
does not question their right to believe the extraordinary or unorthodox, 
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nor to worship in some unusual manner, but rather challenges their 
employment of techniques of coercive persuasion, whereby their recruits 
lose the ability to make up their own minds or act according to their own 
wills. 
ii 
Those who would deny cultists First Amendment protections because 
of alleged use of mind-manipulative techniques on recruits have a difficult 
case to prove. They must demonstrate, as matters of fact and evidence, the 
deliberate use of the technique in the particular case in question.17 What is 
more, the general argument needs to be so convincingly presented that 
such techniques are not only identifiable but may be shown as effective in 
analogous cases. Serious difficulties are encountered at both points. On the 
general issue, as many expert witnesses may be mustered on one side as the 
other; theories vary widely as to the effectiveness of such a technique as 
coercive persuasion.18 Walter Reich, a research psychiatrist at the Na-
tional Institute of Mental Health, points out that theories about coercive 
persuasion have not as yet been subjected to enough scrutiny for making 
reliable judgments as to the power of the brainwashing experience or its 
effects on subsequent attitudes and behavior.19 Which techniques are 
required, which optional? For how long must they be applied and with 
what intensity or frequency of repetition? What kinds of attitudinal or 
behavioral changes are to be expected, and what changes are less likely? 
How lasting are the purported effects? Are we dealing with brainwashing 
in states similar to hypnosis, in which the conventional assertion has been 
that suggestibility has limits, such as deeply held convictions or matters of 
personal survival? In order to claim scientific authority regarding brain-
washing, a broad consensus on such issues, resulting from experimentation 
and observation independently established, would need to be available. 
The factual issue may be almost as intractable as the theoretical. The 
deliberate application of techniques needs to be demonstrated; circumstan-
tial evidence is, of itself, inadequate. The accusation made against the 
Hare Krishna group that they intentionally practiced coercive persuasion 
because a copy of Lifton's book was found in their possession simply will 
not do.2 0 Group leaders have as much reason for studying the book in 
order to understand the accusations made against them of using totalist 
methods, as to learn to apply them more efficiently. 
A case conceivably can be made that the techniques of mental 
manipulation are to some degree implicit in the kind of totalist perspectives 
endemic to some cults. The hymnody of the Unification Church, for 
example, tends to instill basic themes along with particular angles of 
meaning. The Fatherhood of God, who providentially cares for his 
children, tends in some of the songs to slide into more particular reference 
to the "Father ," Sun Myung Moon. Code-images or phrases known only 
to initiates elicit identification with those " in the know" and thus draw 
individuals into group allegiances.21 Meanwhile, the doctrines of the 
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Divine Principle encourage the simplification of societal and personal 
problems by centering all analysis around a few propositions, including the 
distinction between the "perfect family'' and the unredeemed descendents 
of Satan. Teachings of the swamis in the Hare Krishna and other Hindu 
traditions, and the terminology of Scientology with its sets of definitions 
from which deviation is not permissible, tend to be replete with the 
"thought-terminating cliches" Lifton found in his studies. Cycles of need-
gratification are established in the practices of cults whereby patterns of 
chanting or silent meditation develop strong longings only they themselves 
may satisfy, while emphases on purity result in feelings of guilt which only 
prescribed ritual and renewed dedication can allay. Observers have 
remarked about the manner in which the repression of sex drives serves to 
deepen allegiance in the cult through the prohibition of preferential 
emotional ties with other members, confining expression of passionate 
devotion to the god or leader.22 In some groups, as in the Unification 
Church, sexuality once "purified" is to be given expression in marriages 
not based on erotic attraction but on religious mission, to be approved (if 
not actually arranged) by the cult authorities. In many, shared symbols, 
practices or doctrines (generally including strong statements about the 
degeneration of contemporary society) undergird a sense of participation 
in a community of the redeemed in an alien world. 
That such practices are used deliberately by cults as techniques to 
enslave or defraud is, however, difficult to prove. Thomas Robbins and 
Dick Anthony point out that those who make such assertions generally 
draw their inferences from reports by ex-cultists.23 Dean Kelley insists that 
post-deprogramming denunciations should be held suspect to some degree 
as the person has "doubly defected," from parental values and then from a 
tightly-formed group, and must operate under "strong pressures for self-
justification."24 One 's natural perception at that point would be that he or 
she had been victimized by ingenious devices of which one could not have 
been expected to be aware. The urgency with which the story must be told 
to the world reinforces the conviction in the believer that brainwashing has 
occurred and continues to be a danger for others. Meanwhile, parents are 
most likely to be comforted in a trying, emotionally-jarring time in their 
own lives by some form of the "outside agitator" syndrome: belief that the 
causes of the strange behavior are not to be sought in deprivations in their 
own family life nor in the possibility that other beliefs or practices could be 
more viable than their own.25 But the insistence that "my son/daughter 
was manipulated" must sooner or later encounter the fact that at some 
point in the process of conversion, the initiate had made an overture, that 
is, had voluntarily approached or responded to the cult. The argument of 
involuntary allegiance or absence of consent is in some way incomplete— 
and what is incomplete is inconclusive. 
What is more, the use of such techniques we have been discussing is not 
in itself criminal. The landmark case in New York, People v. Murphy, was 
the consequence of the abduction of two Krishna devotees by their parents 
in a deprogramming effort which failed. The devotees pressed charges, 
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only to find the Queens County Grand Jury counter-charging that the 
Krishna Consciousness leaders had kept the two in a state of "unlawful 
imprisonment by psychological means . " The judge dismissed the indict-
ment, insisting that the maintenance of religious beliefs by methods of 
mind control is not a criminal offense.26 This is not to say, however, that a 
religious group is exempt from prosecution for conscious deception or false 
advertising. If stated assurances of particular results from courses offered 
and paid for on a commercial basis are not realized, groups will continue to 
be subject to litigation. But the distinction from the maintenance of 
religious beliefs and practices by a community of faith is clear. Such 
procedures are not criminal. 
Actually, many of the "techniques" of "mind-manipulation" we have 
been examining as implicit in a totalistic faith system have been in use by 
established churches, synagogues and temples for centuries. Is the singing 
of hymns or the bowing in reverence before the Torah or the cross to be 
proscribed as among the "techniques of mind control?" Is catechistic 
instruction, summarizing complicated doctrinal positions for the appropri-
ation of the young or unlearned to be forbidden? Are vows of celibacy to be 
disallowed by law because they imply sexual repression? Surely the wealthy 
merchant of Assisi, when his son Francis became mentally transfixed by 
strange obsessions, losing the ability to "think in reality-oriented terms," 
must have been as disturbed as any contemporary parent by a daughter or 
son's decision to join a cult. What then is the difference between cults and 
churches? Before one cites the openness of the latter to alternative ideas, he 
or she should first review enough history to see how long that openness has 
taken some communities to achieve and how far away it may remain for 
others. As for marketing techniques which give less than full disclosure, the 
precedent is readily available in pervasive business practices and the 
remedies for gross violations are the same under current laws. 
iii 
Let us suppose that a consensus were established in the scientific 
community on the effectiveness of the manipulative methods Lifton 
identifies, and legislation were passed making employment of such tech-
niques a criminal offense. We would still have difficulties justifying direct 
interventions against cults in their religious activities, difficulties so serious 
as to offer such justifications little chance of success. 
First, the analogy of the initiation and conversion procedures of cults 
with indoctrination methods on the Korean War prisoners Lifton studied is 
clearly too remote to apply to most cults. While Lifton's studies included 
non-prisoners, his typology of brainwashing techniques is evidently drawn 
from and most clearly visible in those suffering in a crucial way: from 
physical restraint, imprisonment. Incarceration has implicit psychological 
as well as physiological effects which resist comparison with the situation of 
recruits in a cult weekend or "intensive." A better analogy for cult 
initiatory procedures would be seduction rather than imprisonment. In this 
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process, too, under the influence of "milieu control/ ' "loaded language" 
and an occasional "thought-terminating cliche," a person may in fact 
discover the analytical or discriminating functions of the mind becoming 
temporarily inactive. This may be attributed to being under some external 
influence but it is understood as neither a matter of compulsion nor 
coercion—that would be rape. The point is that temporary lapses in the 
discriminating functions of the mind and the choice-making operations of 
the will are pervasive and presumably natural aspects of the human 
experience, which does not indicate that mind or will are thereby 
constitutively paralyzed. Our usual experience is that mental and volun-
tary capacities soon return, albeit sometimes not before original intentions 
have been compromised. Human growth in part is precisely a matter of 
learning to deal not only with external influences but with our own internal 
processes, needs, drives, wants and wishes, as well. 
A second consideration against the argument for coercive persuasion is 
that it calls for nothing less than a fundamental change in our legal system, 
a change so extensive as to require overwhelming proof to warrant it. 
Walter Reich commented on the Patricia Hearst trial, in which F. Lee 
Bailey argued a novel defense, that Miss Hearst ought not to be held 
responsible for her actions in the robbery of the Hibernia Bank because she 
was an involuntary participant. Because it became clear that she affirmed 
allegiance to the Symbionese Liberation Army, his argument was elabo-
rated: in the early weeks of her captivity she was "brainwashed." 
Psychiatrists testified that such a process of "coercive persuasion" could 
have been used. Reich finds this argument and the testimony supporting it 
threatening. He holds that criminal law is based on the assumption that we 
are personally responsible for our behavior, that we as human beings can 
choose between right and wrong and, when we do wrong, can be assured to 
have so chosen. We are then criminally responsible. In the philosophy of 
the law, the only exceptions are those who lack free will, who do not have a 
mens rea, an evil mind or "vicious will," for, in Blackstone's terms: "An 
unwarrantable act without a vicious will is no crime at al l ."2 7 Persons who 
may be said to lack free or vicious wills are children who are not 
responsible for their actions under criminal law, the insane or those who 
are externally coerced. Insanity must really be insanity, not the mere 
suggestibility of it, and coercion must really be coercion, not vague threat. 
The attempt to open up a new category, those subjected to internal 
coercion, combines the inadmissible variants of these others. The law is 
threatened because " the concept of free will on which it is based is already 
fragile," according to Reich, and would suffer continued attacks which 
ultimately could undermine it altogether.28 
A third consideration requiring notice is argued by William Shepherd. 
He holds that a case justifying intervention, on the grounds that techniques 
of coercive persuasion were applied, will inevitably run afoul of the free 
exercise clause. His analysis of relevant cases led him to identify five 
elements in the "balancing of interests" mode of judicial treatment. Five 
essential questions may apply and require answers: 
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1) Are the religious beliefs in question sincerely held? 
2) Are the religious practices under review germane to the religious 
belief system? 
3) Would carrying out the state's wishes constitute a substantial 
infringement on the religious practice? 
4) Is the interest of the state compelling? Does the religious practice 
perpetrate some grave abuse of a statutory prohibition or obliga-
tion? 
5) Are there alternative means of regulation by which the state's 
interest is served but the free exercise of religion less burdened?29 
The aura of sincerity obvious in young converts will support the cult's 
contentions; the integrity of their practices and beliefs is generally difficult 
to disprove. Surely the state's sanction of a deprogramming effort would be 
nothing less than a "substantial infringement on the religious practice." It 
would require the balance of a strongly compelling interest on the part of 
the state, difficult to substantiate: is it all that critical for the welfare of the 
society that a particular person has taken on new religious commitments? 
Further, is not deprogramming as drastic an alternative as may be devised? 
The focus of the argument then must turn to the religious belief, for to 
claim that techniques of persuasion were used in a manipulative manner is 
to probe the intrapsychic foundations of the defendant's faith—how it was 
gained and supported. Such a judicial review would insinuate the legal 
presence of the state into a realm where it has no constitutional right to 
interfere. 
A fourth consideration may be included against the argument for 
coercive persuasion. Techniques of mind control are claimed to reduce 
victims to mental zombies with perpetual smiles on their faces and other-
worldly gazes. But one tradition's "zombie" may be another's "person at 
peace with himself." However, Robert Shapiro entertains the theoretical 
possibility that legal intervention could be justified if it can be shown that 
the person in question had been actually changed into a robot, a "non-
person," by mental manipulations. Reich's objection that vague alter-
natives to mental incompetence will undermine the legal system is avoided 
by specificity: he or she would have lost personal autonomy, the capacity to 
make independent decisions, particularly having been rendered incapable 
of choosing religious beliefs. 
Although the theoretical possibility is offered, an actual intervention is 
encumbered with obstacles. How could the transformation of a person into 
a robot be verified? It would obviously be itself a form of mental 
manipulation if the state would insist that the subject demonstrate 
independence of mind by giving up the recently adopted religious beliefs, 
besides being a blatant violation of the "free exercise" clause. The 
"vict im" must be shown to have been "involuntarily subjected to 
persuasive influences and, as a result of that coercion, must presently lack 
the capacity to adopt or affirm a genuine belief."30 The conversion must 
be demonstrated as involuntary because one must have the right to subject 
oneself to a coercive process. A further obstacle is that the argument could 
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not base itself in any way on the content of a religious belief to demonstrate 
mental incompetence or incapacity. That again would transgress the "free 
exercise" boundary. What is more, even if the case could still be made that 
a person had been changed into a robot by coercive procedures, the 
remedy the court could legitimately allow must not subvert First Amend-
ment protections. "Specifically, the treatment would have to restore the 
capacity to choose religious beliefs without dictating the content of those 
beliefs. Otherwise, deprogramming becomes nothing more than re-
programming. " 3 1 
iv 
Enough court cases have resulted in rulings on cults that precedents are 
fairly well established. We have noted that charges against the leadership of 
a local Hare Krishna Temple concerning use of mind control techniques 
were dismissed in People v. Murphy (1977). Justice John J . Leahy disallowed 
inferences that the situation parallelled cases involving "psychologically 
induced confessions, . . . hypnosis to destroy free will, intoxication, and 
coverture," for in those the defendents were seeking to compel victims to 
perform illegal acts. The judge affirmed that 
Religious proselytizing and the recruitment of and maintenance of 
belief through a strict regimen, meditation, chanting, self-denial 
and the communication of other religious teachings cannot under 
our laws—as presently enacted—be construed as criminal in nature 
and serve as a basis for a criminal indictment.32 
In March of the same year, the parents of several "Moonies" sought 
grants of conservatorship over their children who not only were legal adults 
at the time but had reached their majority before having joined the 
religious group. San Francisco Superior Court Judge S. Lee Vavuris 
granted a thirty-day conservatorship on the basis not of researching the 
law, which he claimed provided "nothing to give . . . a guiding light, ' ' but 
on his understanding of what he called " the essence of civilization," the 
concern of parents for their children. Two of the converts were quickly 
deprogrammed but another pressed the case.33 In Katz v. Superior Court the 
decision was reversed at the appellate level: "The (lower) court's orders 
following the hearing . . . contain no findings of fact which would disclose 
the ground or grounds on which the orders were based."3 4 
The California law under which the case originally had been brought 
provided that a conservator could be appointed over a person "likely to be 
deceived or imposed upon by artful or designing persons."3 5 The ruling 
included these observations: 
Although the words 'likely to be deceived or imposed upon by artful 
or designing persons' may have some meaning when applied to the 
loss of property which can be measured, they are too vague to be 
applied in the world of ideas. In an age of subliminal advertising, 
television exposure, and psychological salesmanship, everyone is 
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exposed to artful and designing persons at every turn. It is 
impossible to measure the degree of likelihood that some will 
succumb. In the field of beliefs, and particular religious tenets, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to establish a universal truth against 
which deceit and imposition can be measured.36 
In any case, the courts have no competence to determine the validity or 
invalidity of a person's chosen religion. The Katz case made clear the 
inadmissibility of sanctioning deprogramming through the use of conser-
vatorship statutes. 
Richard Delgado proposes an alternative approach to the prosecution 
of cult leadership: using the prohibition of slavery in the Thirteenth 
Amendment as a basis.37 Delgado has previously written extensively on 
the constitutional issues on coercive persuasion both by cultists and 
deprogrammers, insisting on the justification of forcible deprogramming 
by virtue of its restorative character: it did not revolutionize their values 
and mental processes but returned persons to a previous, stable condi-
tion.38 Nevertheless, Delgado acknowledges the difficulties posed by the 
free exercise clause and hence offers another strategy: the attack on the 
basis of involuntary servitude avoids the problem of an initial voluntariness 
on the part of the convert. Further, such a strategy need not rely on a 
medical model for finding cults culpable, placing the state in a therapeutic 
role which may become precedental for dealing with other forms of dissent. 
The state here becomes emancipator, releasing persons from a bondage all 
the more insidious by being internal. 
Shepherd counters this argument insisting that the medical model is 
operative nonetheless. A real difficulty emerges with the person Delgado 
calls the "happy slave," who does not perceive him or herself in 
involuntary servitude. The happy slave must be shown to be mentally 
incapable of understanding how bound he or she is—an endeavor which 
leads us directly back to the medical model. What is more, investigation 
into the intrapsychic aspects of the process of conversions to a particular set 
of beliefs carries one into the evaluation of those beliefs themselves, which 
is precisely what is constitutionally forbidden. 
Cases grounded in the Thirteenth Amendment strategy have failed. In 
Turner v. Unification Church (1979) the plaintiff charged that the church had 
conspired to hold her in involuntary servitude by threats and that the 
resultant fear destroyed her ability to resist; she had been required to work 
long hours at jobs she would not have chosen. Her argument was not 
allowed: the court required evidence of both complete psychological 
domination and physical restraint if the charge were to hold.39 
The consequences of Peterson v. Sorlien (1980) are more ambiguous. The 
Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the lower court ruling excusing parents 
and deprogrammers from charges of false imprisonment and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress brought in a tort case. The parents insisted 
that their adult daughter's mental processes had been impaired and 
pointed out that she was not always uncooperative in the deprogramming 
attempt. The court held that in such a situation "limitations upon the 
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child's mobility do not constitute meaningful deprivation of personal 
liberty sufficient to support a judgment for false imprisonment. ' '4 0 Fur-
thermore, the obvious good-will of the parents in undertaking the project 
was held as an adequate counter to the charge concerning infliction of 
emotional distress. 
Several factors ought to inhibit the use of Peterson v. Sorlien to 
countenance deprogramming. Two strongly dissenting opinions were filed, 
both based on First Amendment freedoms of association and belief: "i t is 
unwise to tamper with those freedoms and with longstanding principles of 
tort law out of sympathy for parents seeking to help their 'misguided' 
offspring, however well-intentioned and loving their acts may b e . " 4 1 
Furthermore, the difficulty in demonstrating false imprisonment in a 
deprogramming attempt ought to make such charges against cults virtually 
impossible. Here the court ruled that voluntary, cooperative behavior 
constituted a waiver of the subject's opposition; how much more voluntary 
is the initial association with a cult? Deprogramming procedures include 
physical abduction, involuntary restraint, sleep and dietary deprivation, 
psychological humiliation and often assault and battery. Deprogramming 
is analogous to imprisonment. As LeMoult has observed, the method of 
deprogramming, a kind of counter-conversion, "is far more like 'brain-
washing' than the conversion process by which members join various 
sects."42 Finally, the Minnesota Court itself was uneasy about precedents 
others might find in its ruling, expressing its disapproval of deprogram-
ming: "owing to the threat deprogramming poses to public order, we do 
not endorse self-help as a preferred alternative."4 3 The court does not go 
nearly far enough in its reservation. It has, in fact, offered a precedent for 
non-interference with parents and déprogrammer, a posture which in 
effect implicates the courts in activities which directly contravene constitu-
tional protections. In his Notes on the State of Virginia, Thomas Jefferson 
wrote two hundred years ago that the effect of coercion in religion was " to 
make half the world fools, and the other half hypocrites."44 
conclusion 
A review of relevant court cases and the arguments behind and within 
them leaves us with some guiding principles regarding the constitutional 
status of the new religious groups often termed "cul ts ." Primary among 
them must be the reiterated insistence on the "fixed star" which is 
traceable all the way back to Jefferson and Madison, that the protections of 
religious liberty must apply to all persons in their religious beliefs, if they 
are to be retained for any. As Justice Jackson vividly described it in one of 
his dissents, " the price of freedom of religion or of speech or of the press is 
that we must put up with, or even pay for, a good deal of rubbish."4 5 
We have seen that the argument which attempts to justify deprogram-
ming or similar interventions by charging cults with the use of methods of 
coercive persuasion fails in terms of legal cogency although the practice 
may still continue to disturb us. The state of the psychological sciences is 
42 
not such as to offer assurance as to the effectiveness or longevity of these 
techniques, and the analogy with the prison experience is too remote to 
stand as legitimate in most cases. Nevertheless, the potential impacts of 
such methods warrant further investigation and research apart from any 
considerations about drafting new legislation. Similarly, the argument 
based on involuntary servitude fails, although the possibility of psychologi-
cal enslavement is troubling. Cults, of course, are not to be immune from 
prosecution, where warranted, on such counts as false advertising, deceit, 
fraud or attempts at tax evation. But clearly, neither are they to be charged 
nor prosecuted in a manner which will interfere in their belief-systems. 
The way to deal with the dangers of mind-manipulating technologies, 
whoever might use them, must be primarily educational. In addition to the 
investigation and research into their operation, educational and religious 
institutions need to find ways of informing their constituents about how 
such technologies function on the one hand and about those internal 
personal needs and inclinations which result in vulnerability, on the other. 
Finally, of even more significance would be initiatives by established 
churches, synagogues, cults or sects in the life of the spirit. Religious 
leaders, acknowledging the application in some cults and churches of 
methods of coercive persuasion, need to develop more clearly and forth-
rightly a religious alternative to totalism, in which the absolute commit-
ment of the person is reserved for the Transcendent Reality, while totalist 
allegiance to any other person, belief-system or institution, is understood 
as undermining the spiritual life. William Shepherd points out that "we 
may wish for openminded and tolerant people, but we cannot produce 
them in the courts. . . . " 4 6 We may not "produce" them in religious 
organizations either, but at least we can nurture the conditions in which 
they may flourish. 
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